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1. Introduction 
Efficient reallocation of production factors in agriculture, such as farmland and labor, is a 
prerequisite for making full use of resources and maximizing agricultural output in a given 
region. The continuous need for this factor reallocation is obvious given that the number, sex, 
and age composition of household members changes over the family life cycle through life 
events and processes such as death, birth, aging, marriage, and migration. Allocation of land 
from land-abundant households to land-scarce households, or allocation of labor from the latter 
to the former will improve the utilization of resources and raise productivity of both households.  
In general, decentralized land sales and rental markets play a key role in reallocating land. 
Recent evidence based on farm-level data suggests that land is reallocated from land-abundant 
to land-scarce households, and from less productive to more productive households, by way of 
sales or rentals (Pant (1983); Skoufias (1995); Kevane (1996); Deininger and Jin (2005; 2008); 
Deininger, Jin, and Nagarajan (2008; 2009); Deininger, Ali, and Alemu (2008); Deinigner, 
Zegarra, and Lavadenz (2003); Vranken and Swinnen (2006)). However, in certain context such 
as China or Vietnam, a centralized “visible hand” of the village or community authority also 
plays a role (Deininger and Jin (2005); Ravallion and van de Walle (2006)). However, such 
administrative reallocation is reported to be less efficient than decentralized market-based 
solutions due to transaction costs related to obtaining information on supply and demand, 
negotiation of contractual terms, and contract enforcement (Deininger and Jin (2005)). 
This paper aims to study the allocation of farmland and labor over a long-period historical 
perspective in pre-modern Japan. In particular, we attempt to answer the following questions. 
How and how well was land and labor reallocated between households? How did households 
react to abundance or scarcity of land with changes of labor endowment over family life cycle? 
The case of pre-modern Japan is of particular interest because, despite the land being allocated 
by both non-market institutions and severely regulated market institutions, the allocation seems 
to be comparably efficient and egalitarian compared to rural societies in the pre-modern West 
(Kurosu and Lundh 2014: 48–50). These facts raise the question of how and why such 
reallocation was achieved under regulated markets. Our aim is to provide figures that describe 
the resource reallocation among households via adjustments for land deficiency and to examine 
the efficiency of land market in this context. 
To examine land and labor reallocation in pre-modern Japan, we study the case of Niita, a 
village in what is now Fukushima Prefecture in northeastern Japan. We make use of a 
longitudinal micro-level data, the Ninbetsu Aratame Cho (NAC)2, a population register spanning 
                                                     
2 The original database (Xavier) was made available by the Eurasian Project on Population 
Family History (1996-2000) directed by Akira Hayami. The database has been extended by and 
now is being hosted at the Population and Family History Project, Reitaku University. 
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150 years between 1720 and 1870. The NAC of this area was taken annually and is known for 
its exceptional quality in terms of length and detail. It covers all households and individuals in 
the village with demographic information, migration details, and information on land (area 
owned, rented, and cultivated). From this information on landholdings per household, we 
construct an index of land deficiency for each household, which measures the gap between a 
“standard” area operated (i.e., cultivated), with adjustment for household characteristics, and the 
actual area owned. We then use non-parametric and parametric techniques to examine how 
households responded to cope with abundance or deficiency of land relative to their labor 
endowments.  
We find that households reacted in several ways to equalize production factors. More 
land-scarce households tended to rent-in or acquire land, or out-migrate kin members, while the 
more land-abundant households tended to rent-out or release land, employ non-kin members, 
acquire additional horses, and in-migrate kin members. The estimates indicate that more than 
80% of the surplus or deficit area of land was dissolved if the household participated in renting 
or transfer of land.  
We argue that this efficient and egalitarian land reallocation was driven by the murauke 
(“village-responsible”) taxation system, where the households in the village were jointly 
responsible to pay the land tax levied to the village as a unit, which was collected as a fixed 
amount of rice. Decline of village members or households and inefficient land use (i.e., land 
abandonment) implied low total production and therefore a more severe tax burden for each 
household, or ultimately a failure in fulfilling the tax duty. To avoid such a situation, the village 
had explicit incentives to maintain the number of households and reallocate land from 
land-abundant to land-scarce households.  
We contribute to our understanding on the function and efficiency of market and non-market 
mechanisms that allocates land. We add a case for pre-modern Japan to the growing literature 
that explores the determinants of participation to land (rental) markets in efforts to assess its 
efficiency (Pant (1983); Skoufias (1995); Kevane (1996); Deinigner, Zegarra, and Lavadenz 
(2003); Deininger and Jin (2005; 2008); Ravallion and van de Walle (2006); Vranken and 
Swinnen (2006); Deininger, Ali, and Alemu (2008); Deininger, Jin, and Nagarajan (2008; 2009)). 
Our case is unique in that the land market was highly regulated by the village, which intervened 
often, but yet achieved a relatively efficient allocation of land.  
We also add to the small but unique literature by Japanese economic historians that explores 
land reallocation in pre-modern Japan, with specific focus on its relationship with family life 
cycle (Numata (2001); Tomobe (2007)). Motivated by Chayanov (1966/86)’s theory of peasant 
economy, Numata and Tomobe indicated that farm households in pre-industrial Japan with a 
larger dependency ratio tended to operate larger land areas, and that such adjustment was 
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supported by land rental rather than transfer. Labor-abundant households were also more likely 
to participate in subsidiary jobs. However, their analyses are mostly based on cross-sectional 
data with a small sample size, rather than tracking of longitudinal changes within the same 
household. This paper is the first systematic quantitative study that fully exploits 
intra-household variation of labor endowment to discuss the relationship between land 
reallocation and family life cycle.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide some accounts on the background 
to understand the context of the study. Section 3 describes the data, measurement, and method 
used for the data analyses. We provide our main results in Section 4. We interpret and discuss 
the findings in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Institutional context 
In this subsection, we give an account on some notable characteristics of households and 
village organizations in preindustrial agrarian Japan, such as households, village organization, 
and household landholding and land tax. Because Tokugawa Japan is known for its regional 
patterns of economic and demographic diversity, we pay special attention to the practices of the 
study village, Niita, in northeastern Japan. 
 
Households and village organization 
Households were important units of production and consumption, and were also vital in 
providing welfare for villagers. Succession or continuity of the household (ie), as in name, 
property, and business, was an overriding aim of family continuity in agrarian Japan, and in turn, 
served as basis for agricultural and further development in the modern economy (Sakane 2011: 
19). The survivorship of households, or more specifically, maintaining the necessary number of 
households as productive units, was also of direct concern for the village organization, where 
lives were structured around farming and where the tax burden was shared (Kurosu 2013).  
According to the population registry of this village, villagers occupied mainly two status 
categories: (a) landholding villagers (honbyakusho); and (b) landless villagers who were either 
landless peasants (mizunomi) or house renters (tanagari). In general, landholding villagers were 
registered in the cadastral register and possessed paddy land, upland, and homestead, enabling 
them to be independent farmers. Such villagers were responsible for payment of basic land taxes, 
allowed to attend village assemblies, and had the right to voice their opinions on village affairs, 
while landless villagers held only minimal strips of land and were not allowed to take part in the 
deciding of village affairs (Sato 1991: 46). These social statuses were by no means fixed or 
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hereditary, and changes in the economic and social conditions of individual peasants resulted in 
shifts in relative class standing (Sato 1991: 47).  
Village officials, in principle, were selected by the village assembly, and the Tokugawa or 
domain government refrained from interfering and merely ratified the choice (Sato 1991: 54). 
However, regional variations in how village officials were selected and functioned were large. 
The nanushi (village head) was typically selected by rotation, election, or hereditary. Sato 
(1991: 55) discusses that where hereditary systems for nanushi prevailed, the position became 
monopolized by a single family and village governance was conducted by a handful of people. 
Indeed, in the case of Niita, the position was succeeded by one family over the observed period. 
Other village officials (kumigashira, group leaders) in the study villages, however, were not 
hereditary and households of solid economic background seem to have served the position in 
turn. 
 
Household landholding and land tax 
One major characteristic of the Tokugawa economy is the kokudaka system (Hayami 1985: 
75–107). All agricultural output was measured, taxes on farmers and peasants (not individually, 
but on their villages as a whole) were assessed, and the income of domain lords and their 
warriors (samurai) were expressed in terms of potential quantity of rice output (koku) rather than 
by area. Therefore, land quality (productivity per area), in addition to area, is adjusted. This was 
standard in the Tokugawa period3.  
De facto land ownership was already established at the time of the study period under the 
Tokugawa regime4. The “ownership” of land was authorized by a registration (nauke) on the 
cadaster (kenchi cho) by the village head. The cadaster was updated upon changes of the 
ownership. Once an owner was registered, he shared the duty to pay a proportion of the land tax 
burdened to the village. Furthermore, the owner was the residual claimant and was able to freely 
dispose of the remaining land output after he had paid his share of the tax burden.  
The land tax and other village taxes were assessed and collected on a per-village basis, as 
corporate units (Brown 2011). That is, taxes on farming villages were imposed not on individual 
households, but on the village as a whole, and the households of titled peasants were responsible 
                                                     
3 The system was facilitated by the physical and social separation of samurai from farmers and 
peasants (Hayami 1985: 75–78). Whereas samurai lived in the castle town of their domain lord, 
villages were inhabited by peasants; thus, in Tokugawa Japan, the so-called landed warriors 
ceased to exist, and samurai became a type of salaried official of the domain governments. 
Meanwhile, villages and peasants were required to pay taxes: in some domains, they were 
required to pay solely in rice; in others, they were to pay in money (Tsuya and Kurosu 2004a: 
257). 
4 For general overview of land institutions in pre-modern Japan, see Watanabe (2007) and 
Otsuka (2002).  
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for shouldering these taxes in accordance with the expected yields of the land they held. Put 
differently, household landholding (in koku) is not the physical size of farm land owned by each 
household, but the expected yield of that land based, on which tax was assessed. In general, the 
land tax was burdened to the village as a fixed amount of rice based on the expected 
productivity and total area of farmland in the village. The land tax was then re-assigned to each 
landowner by the village head or village administrators. Households in the village were obliged 
a joint liability in paying the tax burdened to the village. These practices characterize the 
murauke (literally meaning “village responsible”) system. “If a peasant failed to contribute his 
share of the tax, the village as a whole had to make up the deficit. This system of communal 
responsibility of the land tax is a distinguishing characteristic of Tokugawa taxation (Sato 1991: 
42).”  
 
Land allocation: Land market, customs and informal interventions 
In 1643, the sale of land was prohibited by law (via the Denpata Eitai Baibai Kinshirei). 
However, while the law prohibited permanent sales, it did not explicitly forbid temporary sales. 
Therefore, land was frequently sold “temporarily” with a pledge for a certain period of years 
(usually 10 to 20 years). Lending and borrowing of money among households in the village was 
common, and land was often used as collateral. When the borrower was not able to repay the 
principal by the end of the term, the land was foreclosed and the ownership transferred to the 
lender. Therefore, this practice of pledge-and-foreclose functioned as a major method of land 
transference, avoiding the official restriction of land sales. There was no legal restriction on land 
rental; as we see below, however, the villages often intervened into rental arrangements.  
The allocation of land was affected by customs, informal rules, and interventions by the 
village. For example, a strong custom that restricted the complete transfer of landownership was 
the practice that when ownership of land was transferred after foreclosure, the original owner 
customarily retained the right to regain the foreclosed land whenever he/she repaid the principal 
(Shirakawabe 1994).  
The village also intervened into the land market. Land in the village was considered to be 
owned by each villager, but at the same time, the village community as a whole was also 
regarded as holding ownership (Watanabe 2007: 146)5. Because of this sense of group 
ownership by the village, the village community intervened significantly in land transactions. 
For example, pledging or selling land to residents of other villages was prohibited or restricted. 
The village was also engaged in the formation of landlord-tenant relationships following the 
transfer of land. The village often set a uniform rent ceiling, and the village head played a role 
                                                     
5 This concept of multi-layered or joint ownership is called “indirect land ownership 
(kansetsu-teki tochi shoji)” in the academics of Japanese pre-modern history. 
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in collecting the rent with land tax on behalf of the landlord (Watanabe 2007: 147).  
There was even an administrative and collective land reallocation6 (warichi) executed 
periodically to even out the tax burden and various risks, including damage from floods, 
landslides, and changes in soil fertility (Watanabe 2008: 71; Brown 1997). The village 
prevented the concentration of the best lands in the hands of a few families and ensured a 
diverse portfolio of lands of all types for each shareholding family (Brown 1997). This practice 
of warichi was often reported in coastal villages and in the Shikoku area but also seen in many 
other parts of the country (Watanabe 2008:72; Brown 1997). In Niita, there is a record of 
warichi occurring in 1794, but the lasting effect in Niita of this event is not clear. Narimatsu 
(1992: 145) claims that the fact warichi was practiced only once in the whole 150-year 
observation period suggests that the 1794 warichi might have been more of formality than a real 
necessity7.  
 
2.2. The setting 
This study draws its data from local population registers in Niita, a farming village in 
northeastern Japan. During the Tokugawa period (1603–1868), the village belonged to the 
Nihonmatsu han (domain) that governed the central part of what is now Fukushima Prefecture. 
Among the major regions of Tokugawa Japan, the northeast was in general the one with the least 
economic development and proto-industrialization. Niita, located on a flat plane between two 
major population centers of domain at the time—the capital town of Nihonmatsu and the 
growing market town of Koriyama—had a relatively good climate for agriculture (Narimatsu 
1992: 4–6). However, as it lay on the bank of the Gohyaku River, the village was vulnerable to 
frequent floods. 
Niita was almost totally agricultural (Narimatsu 1992: 6) and the livelihood in the village was 
often at the mercy of fluctuations in agricultural output. Households and their members were 
often vulnerable to income variations caused by frequent crop failures and famines. In particular, 
the northeastern region surrounding Niita experienced a series of serious famines: the Horeki 
famine in 1755, the most devastating and long Tenmei famine from 1783 to 1787, and the 
Tempo famine from 1836 to 1838 (Tsuya and Kurosu 2004b: 256).  
Landholding, reflecting household wealth, had a strong bearing on the demographic 
behaviors of peasants in rural communities in Japan. Recent studies on the same data 
demonstrated a significant relationship between household landholdings and individual 
probabilities of death, marriage, migration, and household continuation (e.g. Tsuya and Kurosu, 
                                                     
6 Brown (1997) calls this custom “repartition”. 
7 However, as we see below, data reveal several spikes of land reallocation where more than 5% 
of the total land in the village was transferred in a year, suggesting some kind of collective 
reallocation that might have not been recorded officially. 
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2004(a), 2004(b), 2010, 2014). For example, children and elderly in wealthier households were 
less likely to die (Tsuya and Kurosu 2004a); landless peasants were more likely to migrate 
rather than die upon major crop failures (Tsuya and Kurosu 2010); and household wealth and 
resources prevented households from going extinct by losing their members due to death, 
migration, or absconding, through increasing the likelihood of headship succession after 
retirement of the previous head (Tsuya and Kurosu 2004b). These observations suggest that 
wealth inequality could incur serious negative effects on one’s livelihood, especially for the poor, 
and indicate the need for land reallocation. Yet another way for peasants to mitigate the adverse 
conditions caused by economic hardship was migration. Peasants are thought to have used 
various types of migration to maintain an optimum level of household economy and size 
(through service, marriage, and adoption) or to flee from economic burden or seek opportunities 
elsewhere (through absconding) (Tsuya and Kurosu 2010, 2013; Kurosu 2011). 
It is important to note that service migration (and out-migration in general) suddenly declined 
after the 1780s, continuing to decline until the end of the Tokugawa period. This change 
coincided with the reversal of the domain's policies from discouragement to encouragement of 
proto-industrial development (Koriyama-shi 1981: 79–81; Nagata, Kurosu and Hayami 1998). 
This suggests that local proto-industrialization including sericulture reduced the likelihood of 
out-migration by making it increasingly unnecessary for peasants to engage in long-term and 
long-distance labor contracts that kept them away from their home villages for 6 months or 
longer (Nagata 2001; Tsuya and Kurosu 2013). 
 
 
3. Data and method 
3.1. Data 
We use the population register (Ninbetsu Aratame Cho) of Niita Village in Nihonmatsu han. 
The data is available for 150 years (1720–1870). Although there are 5 missing years (1742, 
1758, 1796, 1857, and 1858), and land data is missing for years from 1725 to 1736, the data 
otherwise cover a virtually undisrupted period spanning the latter half of the Tokugawa era 
(1603–1868).  
The NAC registers enumerated individuals residing in the village in terms of household (the 
NAC registers were in some sense household registers) and contain a wealth of information 
pertaining to the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of households and their 
members, including household size and composition, wealth, and relationships. The NAC for 
Niita is particularly suited for this study as it contains a detailed description regarding land 
transactions: land owned, cultivated, and leased (from/to whom and for how long).  
Our sample size is 134 years and 14,490 household–years. The number of unique households 
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observed in the data is 298. Most of the analysis below uses the household–year as the unit of 
observation.  
 
3.2. Method 
The key variable of interest is the index of land deficiency, which measures the imbalance of 
land and labor in a household. The land deficit (LD) is defined as  
 
ܮܦ௜ ൌ ܣ௜∗ െ ܣ௜    (1) 
 
where ܣ௜∗ is the “standard” (effective) area8 operated and ܣ௜ is the actual area owned by 
household ݅.  
We construct two indexes. The first index is the unadjusted land deficit where the standard 
area operated is determined by egalitarian distribution of the sum of area owned in the village 
(i.e., total area of land in the village), among households based on their number of kin members. 
That is, 
 
ܣ௜∗ ൌ ∑ ஺೔೔∑ ௅೔೔ ൈ ܮ௜    (2) 
 
where ܮ௜ is the number of kin members for household ݅. The unadjusted land deficit is the 
most simple, crude measure of land deficiency. However, it does not take into account 
differences in household characteristics such as the household status, and sex/age composition.  
The second measure is the adjusted land deficit, where the standard area operated is predicted 
by adjusting for differences in household characteristics. To construct the adjusted standard area 
operated, we fit the following linear model for each year with ordinary least squares (OLS): 
 
ܣ௜ ൅ ܣ௜௥ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜,   (3) 
 
where ܣ௜௥ is the net area rented-in (negative if rented-out, so the left-hand side is the area 
operated) and ௜ܺ is the vector of household characteristics. We then use the estimates ߙො and 
ߚመ  to predict the adjusted standard area operated for each household: 
 
ܣప∗෢ ൌ ߙො ൅ ߚመ ௜ܺ.    (4) 
                                                     
8 All data of land are measured and recorded by potential quantity of output of rice (in koku) 
rather than by area. Therefore, land quality (productivity per area) as well as area are adjusted. 
See discussion in 2.1. 
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In doing so, we set the number of non-kin members to zero. Thus, ܣప∗෢ represents the “standard” 
area operated, if a household operated the land with only their kin members9.  
Appendix Table A1 reports the OLS estimates of equation (3), pooling all years (note that 
the actual ܣప∗෢ is estimated for each year separately). We include: the head’s age and its square; 
dummy for female-headed household; dummies for non-landowner (non-honbyakusho) status; 
landless (mizunomi) and others; dummy for branch household (bunke); number of horses; 
number of kin members by sex and age groups (below 15, 15–54, above 55 years old); and 
number of non-kin members as independent variables. Estimates indicate that non-landowner 
household status is negatively correlated with area, while number of horses and number of 
workers (both kin and non-kin) are correlated positively10.  
The outcome of interest is the adoption of factor-ratio stabilization strategies to cope with 
land deficiency. Instantaneous strategies that are observed in the same year facing land 
deficiency include: renting-out land and hiring non-kin members for land-abundant households; 
and renting-in land for land-scarce households. More fundamental strategies to deal with land 
deficiency that can be observed during a certain time interval are: acquiring land; increasing kin 
members (in-migration); and increasing number of horses for land-abundant households; while 
releasing land or decreasing kin members (out-migration) for land-scarce households. We 
created dummy variables for adoption of these strategies.  
We quantitatively examine two questions on land allocation. First, did households adopt 
strategies to stabilize their land-to-labor ratio? To answer this, we estimate a probit model that 
regress the adoption of various factor-ratio stabilization strategies on land deficit and other 
controls. Secondly, how much of the land deficit had been adjusted? Conceptually, the 
adjustment coefficient ߠ is defined by  
 
    ܴ௜ ൌ ߠሺܣ௜∗ െ ܣ௜ሻ    (5) 
 
where ܴ௜ is the net area of rental (or transfer), and ܣ௜∗ െ ܣ௜ is the land deficit as defined above 
(Otsuka (2007)). If ߠ ൌ 1, the land deficit is completely adjusted. We regress the following 
model with OLS to estimate ߠ: 
 
                                                     
9 There were few cases where ܣప∗෢ ൏ 0. For those observations, we set them to zero. 
10 The estimates indicate that the coefficient of the number of adult female kin members tend to 
be almost twice as large as that of male members: in column (4) the coefficient of the number of 
kin members for female and men aged 15–54 is 1.612 (95% CI: 1.154–2.070) vs. 0.967 (95% 
CI : 0.468–1.466) and 1.371 (95% CI: 0.767–1.975) vs. 0.583 (95% CI: -0.103–1.270) for age 
55 years old and above. We do not have a clear explanation for this result. 
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ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠܮܦ௜௧ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧,   (6) 
 
where ݕ௜௧ is the net area rented-in for year ݐ or net area acquired during year ݐ and ݐ ൅ 1 
(1-year interval) or during year ݐ and ݐ ൅ 10 (10-year interval). ݕ௜௧ is negative if rented-out 
or released. ܮܦ௜௧ is the index of land deficit, ௜ܺ௧ is the vector of household characteristics, ߜ௧ 
is the year dummy, and ߝ௜௧ is the error term. We estimate Eq. (6) with and without household 
fixed effects. 
 
 
4. Results 
In this section, we examine the efficiency of land allocation between households. We first 
describe the data, and then report the results on adoption of factor-equalization strategies and 
the extent to which land rental or land transfer functioned for the adjustment of land deficit. 
 
4.1. Description of the data  
Figure 1 depicts the trend of population and the number of households with resident 
members. The population had been relatively stable at around 520–540 persons with some 
fluctuations until the early 1770s, a decade before the Great Tenmei famine. However, from 
about 1770 until 1820, the population dropped from 514 persons to 367 persons, representing a 
29% decline. The population then began to increase again and recovered to 1770 levels in 1861, 
reaching the highest recorded population of 555 persons in the final year of observation (1870). 
The number of households followed a similar trend, except that it did not recover after the 
decline. The number of households had been relatively stable at around 120–130 with minor 
fluctuations until the early 1780s (the decade of the Great Tenmei famine), but declined 
gradually and steadily from 143 in 1772 to 92 in 1843, a 36% decline. The number then 
stabilized at around 90 until the end of the NAC records.  
Accordingly, the mean household size (defined by number of kin and non-kin members) 
shows an impressive increase, particularly after the end of the Tempo famine (1838). The mean 
household size was 4.0 in 1720, but rose to 6.2 by the end of observation in 1870. Kurosu 
(2010) attributes this dramatic increase of the household size to at least three factors: increase 
number of children (Tsuya and Kurosu 2010); compositional change of households due to the 
decline of solitary households and the increase of the stem family household; and the decline of 
the proportion of landless households. 
Figure 2 depicts the land “market”, the trend of the total area owned, operated, rented-in, and 
rented-out, for all recorded households. The total area owned or operated is meant to represent 
the total area of arable land in the village, or the extent of the village’s land “market”. Figure 3 
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depicts the proportion of the total area transferred (released or acquired) relative to the total area 
of land owned the previous year, which captures the activeness of the land “sales”. Figure 4 
depicts the proportion of the total area rented relative to the total area of land owned in the same 
year, which captures the activeness of the land rental market.  
Figure 5 shows the trend of the share of households by landholding strata. We categorized 
the households by area of land owned into 5 strata: 0 koku (landless); 0–4 koku; 5–10 koku; 10–
14 koku; and 15+ koku. Two features are apparent from the figure: first, there was a decline in 
the share of landless households. In 1720, there were 45 (34% of 136) landless households. The 
number and the proportion of the landless continued to decline, reaching 4 households in 1843, 
and not increasing beyond 5 households thereafter. Second, the proportion of households with 
10–14 koku increased, accounting for a plurality of households after 1794 and exceeding 50% 
after 1853.  
Table 1 shows the characteristics of households for all observations and observations by four 
adjusted land deficit groups (<-5, -5–0, 0–5, and 5+ koku). Land-abundant households tend to 
have a larger area owned (per kin member) but reduced their operated area by renting out land. 
Households in the most land-scarce group tend to have more kin members, while households in 
the most land-abundant group tend to hire a non-kin member. On average, the land-to-labor 
ratio, based on operated land and number of kin members, is 2.8 koku, which means that each 
worker cultivates approximately 3 koku of land. Thus, the most land-abundant or land-scarce 
group, with more than 5 koku of land surplus or deficit, are in excess or short of land that 
require roughly two (1.8) or more workers to cultivate. 
Figure 6 depicts the trend of the standard deviation of land-to-labor ratio among households, 
defined by combination of area owned or area operated and with and without non-kin members. 
The standard deviation is lower when it is defined by area operated as opposed to area owned, 
and when including the number of non-kin members. These imply that land rental and hiring of 
non-kin members helps equalize the factor ratio among households.  
 
4.2. Adoption of factor equalization strategies 
Figure 7 depicts the non-parametric estimates of Cleveland (1979)’s mean-adjusted locally 
weighted regressions (Lowess smoother) of adoption of three factor-ratio stabilization strategies 
(land rental, land transfer, and social migration of kin members) on adjusted land deficit.  
Table 2 reports the average marginal effects of the Probit model regressing the adoption of 
factor equalization on adjusted land deficit group dummies and other controls. Figure A1 in the 
Appendix visualizes the average predicted probabilities of adopting each strategy by adjusted 
land deficit groups, based on estimates. The reference land deficit group is the group with 
adjusted land deficit between 0–5 koku. Estimates indicate that compared to the reference group, 
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the additional percentage points for the most land-abundant group (land surplus > 5 koku) to 
rent-out is 23.5 (95% confidence interval (CI): 18.2–28.9); to employ non-kin members is 13.5 
(95% CI: 8.6–18.5); and to release land is 6.1 (95% CI: 4.7–7.6). However, the additional 
percentage points for the most land-scarce group (land deficit > 5 koku) to rent-in is 15.0 (95% 
CI: 8.9–21.1) and to acquire land is 1.8 (95% CI: 0.4–3.2). Adjustment through migration is not 
statistically significant at the 5% level, but the direction is consistent with factor-ratio 
stabilization: additional percentage points for the most land-abundant group to in-migrate is 0.9 
(95% CI: -0.99–2.75) and the additional percentage points for the most land-scarce group to 
out-migrate is 1.5 (95% CI: -0.39–3.41). 
Taken together, this evidence indicates a consistent pattern: the more land-scarce households 
tend to rent-in, acquire land, and out-migrate kin members, while the more land-abundant 
households tend to rent-out, employ non-kin members, increase the number of horses, release 
land, and in-migrate kin members. Clearly, these are signs that households reacted to adjust to 
land deficiency and stabilize the land-to-labor ratio.  
 
4.3. Land adjustment coefficient 
Figure 8a plots the net area rented-in on adjusted land deficit. Both variables are measured in 
the same year ݐ. The 45-degree line guides the case of ߠ ൌ 1; the land deficit is perfectly 
adjusted for by land rental. The figure shows a clear positive correlation between the two 
variables. This suggests that land-abundant households tend to rent-out while land-scarce 
households tend to rent-in land. However, the Lowess smoother with all observations is largely 
deviated above the 45-degree line for the more land-abundant observations. This is driven by 
many observations of autarkic households that did not rent-out even though they owned 
excessive land. The Lowess smoother that considers only participants in land rental, appears to 
trace the 45-degree line more closely, especially for land-scarce observations. 
Table 3, panel A reports the OLS estimates of the adjustment coefficient. As the main 
explanatory variable of interest, we use crude area owned in columns (1)–(4), adjusted land 
deficit in columns (5)–(8), and unadjusted land deficit in columns (9)–(12). Household 
characteristics are also included as controls (full estimates are reported in Table A2 in the 
Appendix). For each of these three main explanatory variables, we estimate equation (6) with 
and without household fixed effects, and using all samples or limited samples that participated 
in land rental. The magnitudes of the coefficients for each model and sample are very similar 
among the three explanatory variables. The estimate in column (5) using adjusted land deficit 
indicates that 30.4% (95% CI: 19.1–41.7) of the land deficit is adjusted for by rental, but in 
column (6), the coefficient increases to 64.1% (95% CI: 50.1–78.2) when restricting the samples 
to participants in land rental. The adjustment coefficients are higher when including household 
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fixed effects: 53.1% (95% CI: 44.4–61.8) for all samples and 80.3% (95% CI: 72.3–88.4) for 
rental participants (columns 7 and 8).  
Figure 8b and Table 3, panel B show similar information for land transfer. The amount of 
land transferred is defined by the difference between the area owned in the base year ݐ (when 
the land deficit is measured) and the following year ݐ ൅ 1. Given that the incidence of land 
transfer is small, many households were not able to adjust their land deficit via this channel. For 
the estimation, we also control for number of deaths and births during years ݐ and ݐ ൅ 1, 
because land transfer is measured as a flow. The estimates in Table 3, panel B, column (5) 
indicates that overall, only 2.4% (95% CI: 1.6–3.3) of the land deficit was resolved through 
transfer by the following year, but if the households participated in land transfer, the adjustment 
coefficient is instead 47.2% (95% CI: 33.1–61.4) (column (6)). Similar to adjustment through 
rental, the adjustment coefficient improves dramatically when household fixed effects are 
included: 5.2% (95% CI: 4.3–6.2) for all samples and 81.6% (95% CI: 66.2–96.9) for samples 
participating in land transfer (columns (7) and (8)). Again, the results suggest that once the 
households were able to participate in land transactions, on average roughly 80% of their land 
deficit was dissolved.  
Table 3 Panel C examines adjustment through transfer for longer intervals of 10 years. The 
dependent variable is the difference of area owned in base year ݐ and year ݐ ൅ 10, where ݐ is 
set for every 10 years after 1740 through 1860 (1720 and 1730 are dropped because land data 
for 1730 is missing). The adjustment coefficient is 22.1% for all samples and 54.8% for samples 
participating in transfer (columns (5) and (6)). When household fixed effects are included, the 
coefficients are 46.5% for all samples and 94.9% for participants (columns (7) and (8)).  
 
 
5. Discussion 
We find that households reacted to stabilize their land-to-labor ratio; namely,: the more 
land-scarce households tended to rent-in or acquire land or out-migrate kin members, while the 
more land-abundant households tended to rent-out or release land, employ a non-kin member, 
increase the number of horses, and in-migrate kin members. Furthermore, the estimates indicate 
that more than 80% of the surplus or deficit land area was resolved if the household participated 
in rental or transfer of land.  
Although simple comparison of the adjustment coefficient requires caution given the 
differences in methodology, the adjustment coefficient of 80% seen in the present study is much 
higher than 30% for renting-out and 20% for renting-in seen in Ethiopia (for years 1999, 2000, 
and 2004) (Deininger, Ali and Alemu (2008)) or 33% for administrative reallocation during a 
5-year interval from 1992/3 to 1997/8 in Vietnam (Ravallion and van de Walle (2006)), roughly 
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equal to the 78% for renting-out and 68% for renting-in seen in India for 1975–1984 (Skoufias 
(1995)), and lower than the 93% for net rental seen in Western Sudan in 1990 (Kevane (1996)). 
In addition, Kurosu and Lundh (2014) reports that land distribution of the two village rural 
communities in the northeastern part of Japan (including the village studied here) was more 
egalitarian than that in western communities in Scania (southern Sweden), Sart (eastern 
Belgium), and Casalguidi (central Italy) in the pre-modern period. Gini coefficients for the 
study populations were 0.74, 0.65, 0.60, respectively, while that for the two northeastern 
villages in Japan was 0.41 (Kurosu and Lundh 2014: 50). These comparisons suggest that land 
reallocation in the current context of the study was relatively efficient and egalitarian.  
What was the underlying mechanism that led to this rather efficient reallocation and 
egalitarian distribution of land? We argue that the village played a key role in reallocating 
intra-village resources to comply with the duty of paying land tax under the murauke system 
discussed in Section 2.1. Under this system, the quantity of tax burdened was, in principle, fixed. 
Inefficient resource allocation in the village, which manifested in extreme cases as land 
abandonment, implied low total production and therefore a more severe tax burden for each 
household, or at worst, failure to fulfil the duty (which meant punishment such as imprisonment 
of the village head). To avoid such situations, the village had explicit incentives to maintain the 
proper number of workers for producing rice and to fully utilize the village’s land. The former 
meant securing the lives of poor or landless households, and the latter implied reallocation of 
land from land-abundant households to land-scarce ones.  
We argue that this is the underlying mechanism that led to the evolution of the idea of 
multi-layered / joint ownership of land, and the customs and informal interventions performed 
by the village for land allocation, as explained in Section 2.1. In theory, the custom of retaining 
the right to regain foreclosed land had the effect of helping households regain land and avoid 
extinction. Setting the rent ceiling secured tenants’ livelihood. Administrative collective land 
reallocation (warichi) also had the effect of rebalance exposure to environmental risks, and may 
have coercively reallocated land from land-abundant to land-scarce households.  
These deductions suggest that the underlying mechanism for the egalitarian distribution and 
efficient allocation of land in the pre-modern Japan was the incentives imposed by the murauke 
system of taxation, encouraging village heads to secure lives of poor or landless households and 
to reallocate land and labor efficiently so as to fulfill the obligation of taxation.  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we studied land reallocation in a pre-modern Japanese village from 1720 to 
1870 by utilizing a population register with demographic and land data. Our major finding is 
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that households tended to equalize their land-to-labor ratio using land and labor “markets”, and 
that more than 80% of the surplus or deficit area of land was resolved if the household 
participated in rental or transfer of land. Therefore, we conclude that the village was successful 
in utilizing its contained resources.  
An important question is why and how such egalitarian and efficient allocation of land was 
achieved. We argued that the incentive structure and institutions configured by the murauke tax 
system to fulfill the joint responsibility of taxation motivated the village to secure the 
livelihoods of poor or landless households and to reallocate land and labor efficiently. Formal 
theoretical investigation of this mechanism is left for future work. 
We are aware of limitations in our analyses. First, we were not able to take labor allocation 
that was not reflected in the NAC into account. For example, a land-abundant household might 
have hired neighbors or relatives who live in a different household and who commuted daily, in 
which case the laborer might not have be recorded as a member of the hiring household. Second, 
we failed to consider subsidiary jobs. A land-scarce household can utilize its abundant labor in 
secondary works such as sericulture or by commuting to nearby towns. Indeed, Tomobe (2007) 
indicates that secondary work was important to absorb the fluctuation of labor endowment over 
the family life cycle. The development of sericulture in this area must be considered in our 
interpretation, as this development changed migration patterns of the area. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Population and number of households 
 
 
Figure 2. Land “market”  
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Figure 3. Proportion of land transferred on total area owned in the previous year 
 
 
Figure 4. Proportion of land rented on sum of area owned in the same year 
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Figure 5. Proportion of households by landholding strata 
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Figure 6. Trend in standard deviation of household land-to-labor ratios 
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a) Land rental 
 
b) Land transfer 
 
c) Social migration of kin-members 
Figure 7. Adjusted land deficit and adoption of factor-equalization strategies 
Note: Mean-adjusted Lowess smoother.  
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a) Rental 
 
b) Transfer (1 year interval) 
Figure 8. Adjusted land deficit and land rental transactions 
Note: Autarky observations are jittered. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics (mean) by adjusted land deficit groups 
 
 
> 5 koku 0‐5 koku 0‐5 koku > 5 koku Full sample
N 2,370 4,208 5,891 2,021 14,490
Head's age 46.0 46.1 46.3 42.4 45.6
Number of kin members 4.1 4.1 3.7 4.6 4.0
Number of non‐kin members 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3
Dummy if non‐kin members > 0 0.240 0.091 0.047 0.101 0.099
Number of female members age <10 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3
Number of male members age <10 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
Number of female members age 10‐14 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
Number of male members age 10‐14 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Number of female members age 15‐54 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.1
Number of male members age 15‐54 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.1
Number of female members age >55 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Number of male members age >55 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Area owned (koku ) 20.7 12.4 6.7 4.2 10.3
Area operated (koku ) 17.2 12.0 7.4 8.4 10.5
Area owned per kin member (koku ) 6.1 3.7 1.6 0.9 2.9
Area owned per kin + non‐kin member (koku ) 5.7 3.7 1.6 0.8 2.8
Area operated per kin member (koku ) 4.6 3.4 1.8 1.9 2.8
Area operated per kin + non‐kin member (koku ) 4.2 3.3 1.8 1.8 2.6
Land deficit (unadjusted) (koku ) ‐10.5 ‐2.5 2.6 7.3 ‐0.4
Land deficit (adjusted) (koku ) ‐10.0 ‐2.2 2.1 7.3 ‐0.4
Surplus Deficit
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Table 2. Probit estimates on adoption of factor-ratio stabilization strategies (average marginal effects) 
 
Note: Increased number of horses, deaths and births, land transfer, and migration are dummies for if such 
event occurred during the base year ݐ (when the adjusted land deficit was measured) and year ݐ ൅ 1. Year 
dummies are included. Robust standard errors are clustered by household in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Employ Increase
Rent‐out Rent‐in member horse Birth Death Released Acquired Out In
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Adjusted land surplus > 5 koku 0.235*** ‐0.0446* 0.135*** 0.00244 0.00497 ‐0.0164* 0.0614*** ‐0.0120* ‐0.00783 0.00882
(0.0274) (0.0199) (0.0254) (0.00787) (0.00705) (0.00647) (0.00736) (0.00500) (0.0110) (0.00955)
Adjusted land surplus 0‐5 koku 0.0594*** 0.00377 0.0371** 0.00386 0.00615 ‐0.00805 0.0124* ‐0.000269 ‐0.0126 0.0147
(0.0123) (0.0153) (0.0119) (0.00648) (0.00632) (0.00590) (0.00489) (0.00546) (0.00804) (0.00760)
Adjusted land deficit > 5 koku 0.0101 0.150*** 0.0117 0.0138 0.00941 ‐0.0130 ‐0.00460 0.0177* 0.0151 ‐0.00962
(0.0190) (0.0312) (0.0139) (0.00751) (0.00743) (0.00744) (0.00474) (0.00707) (0.00969) (0.00852)
Head's age 0.00107** ‐0.000595 ‐0.00133** ‐0.000325 ‐0.00124*** 0.000692*** ‐0.000189 0.000161 ‐0.000378 0.0000233
(0.000393) (0.000445) (0.000452) (0.000189) (0.000191) (0.000179) (0.000190) (0.000126) (0.000255) (0.000225)
Female head ‐0.00195 ‐0.0236 ‐0.0645*** ‐0.0217* ‐0.00878 0.0121 0.00787 ‐0.000805 0.0207 0.116***
(0.0190) (0.0217) (0.0136) (0.00871) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.00860) (0.00736) (0.0121) (0.0166)
Status: Mizunomi ‐0.158*** 0.349*** 0.0371 ‐0.0282*** ‐0.0108 ‐0.00357 0.0193** ‐0.0126 ‐0.0461***
(0.0108) (0.0365) (0.0321) (0.00792) (0.00811) (0.00776) (0.00723) (0.0106) (0.00928)
Status: Others ‐0.0835** 0.0429 0.125** ‐0.0144 ‐0.0150 ‐0.0148 ‐0.0219*** ‐0.0131 ‐0.0660*** ‐0.0675**
(0.0295) (0.0842) (0.0472) (0.0217) (0.0253) (0.0170) (0.00376) (0.00943) (0.0165) (0.0217)
Bunke ‐0.0547** 0.0810*** ‐0.0233 0.0103 ‐0.000885 ‐0.00356 ‐0.00144 0.0105** ‐0.00864 ‐0.00834
(0.0193) (0.0176) (0.0181) (0.00704) (0.00559) (0.00525) (0.00459) (0.00405) (0.00886) (0.00782)
Number of horses ‐0.0503** 0.0636*** 0.134*** 0.00909 0.0288*** ‐0.00994 ‐0.0129* 0.00550 ‐0.0789*** 0.0199*
(0.0157) (0.0190) (0.0171) (0.00712) (0.00562) (0.00553) (0.00523) (0.00450) (0.0104) (0.00820)
Number of female members age <10 ‐0.00969 0.0135 0.0255** ‐0.00914* ‐0.00542 0.0259*** ‐0.0000689 0.00244 ‐0.000300 ‐0.0231***
(0.0100) (0.0106) (0.00824) (0.00447) (0.00450) (0.00453) (0.00497) (0.00354) (0.00501) (0.00510)
Number of male members age <10 ‐0.00732 0.0235* 0.00584 0.00321 ‐0.0161*** 0.0272*** 0.00376 0.00632 0.0116* ‐0.0409***
(0.00855) (0.00927) (0.00911) (0.00398) (0.00458) (0.00424) (0.00379) (0.00330) (0.00493) (0.00457)
Number of female members age 10‐14 0.00235 0.00880 0.00114 0.00426 ‐0.00976 0.00973 0.000692 0.00809 0.0685*** 0.0150*
(0.0119) (0.0121) (0.00837) (0.00676) (0.00552) (0.00609) (0.00627) (0.00473) (0.00668) (0.00620)
Number of male members age 10‐14 ‐0.00264 0.0180 0.00988 ‐0.00146 ‐0.0181*** 0.00863 0.0122* 0.0103* 0.0197** ‐0.0171*
(0.0100) (0.0131) (0.00959) (0.00587) (0.00501) (0.00596) (0.00594) (0.00483) (0.00723) (0.00677)
Number of female members age 15‐54 ‐0.00997 0.0417*** 0.0233** 0.00926* 0.0556*** 0.0151*** 0.00273 ‐0.0000281 0.0591*** ‐0.0245***
(0.00993) (0.00965) (0.00762) (0.00399) (0.00478) (0.00408) (0.00415) (0.00343) (0.00537) (0.00551)
Number of male members age 15‐54 ‐0.0234** 0.0277** 0.00549 ‐0.00600 0.0181*** 0.0148*** 0.00194 0.00517 0.0623*** 0.0123*
(0.00893) (0.0103) (0.00973) (0.00487) (0.00418) (0.00421) (0.00386) (0.00371) (0.00579) (0.00543)
Number of female members age >55 ‐0.0206 0.0452*** 0.00397 0.00167 0.0171** 0.0472*** ‐0.00173 0.00336 0.0222*** ‐0.00499
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0111) (0.00596) (0.00522) (0.00441) (0.00543) (0.00444) (0.00593) (0.00628)
Number of male members age >55 ‐0.0570*** 0.00215 0.0137 ‐0.00119 0.00393 0.0492*** ‐0.000309 ‐0.00455 0.0185** ‐0.00537
(0.0164) (0.0151) (0.0124) (0.00587) (0.00607) (0.00519) (0.00484) (0.00422) (0.00697) (0.00743)
Number of female members born 0.00299 ‐0.000568 0.0123 ‐0.0589*** 0.00112
(0.00883) (0.00984) (0.00742) (0.0146) (0.0128)
Number of male members born 0.0163 ‐0.0108 0.0173* ‐0.0382** ‐0.0390**
(0.00920) (0.0121) (0.00808) (0.0133) (0.0149)
Number of female members age <10 died ‐0.0115 ‐0.00199 ‐0.0166 0.00362 0.00425
(0.0171) (0.0203) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0261)
Number of male members age <10 died ‐0.00652 ‐0.0222 ‐0.00652 ‐0.0251 0.0198
(0.0159) (0.0179) (0.0138) (0.0235) (0.0220)
Number of female members age 10‐14 died 0.0458 0.0165
(0.0645) (0.0875)
Number of male members age 10‐14 died ‐0.0295 0.0661* 0.0445 0.0955
(0.0532) (0.0275) (0.0549) (0.0593)
Number of female members age 15‐54 died 0.0597*** 0.0295 ‐0.0129 0.0306 0.0977***
(0.0143) (0.0159) (0.0223) (0.0221) (0.0184)
Number of male members age 15‐54 died 0.0559*** 0.0286 0.00864 0.0440 0.0709**
(0.0169) (0.0148) (0.0166) (0.0230) (0.0268)
Number of female members age >55 died 0.0152 ‐0.00900 ‐0.0329 ‐0.00341 0.0246
(0.0145) (0.0207) (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0190)
Number of male members age >55 died 0.0245* ‐0.00913 ‐0.0000376 0.00481 0.0279
(0.0122) (0.0196) (0.0141) (0.0164) (0.0183)
N 14472 14472 14490 13238 13615 14403 5458 8336 13615 13607
Land rental MigrationDeath and birth Land transfer
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Table 3. OLS/Fixed effects estimates on land adjustment 
 
Note: Each panel reports separate estimates. See Tables A2–A4 in Appendix for full results. The dependent variable is the net area rented-in (in koku) 
(negative if rented-out) for Panel A, net area acquired (koku) (negative if released) at 1-year intervals (i.e., during year ݐ and ݐ ൅ 1) for Panel B, and net area 
acquired (koku) (negative if released) at 10-year intervals (i.e., during year ݐ and ݐ ൅ 10) for Panel C. The key independent variable is area owned (koku) or 
adjusted (or unadjusted) land deficit (koku) in year ݐ. Other controls for all panels include: head age, head age squared, female head (dummy), household 
status dummy (mizunomi, and others; reference = honbyakusho), bunke (dummy), number of horses, number of household members by sex–age category in 
year ݐ, and year fixed effects. In addition, in Panels B and C, the number of household members born and died during the observation interval by sex–age 
category is also included. Samples for Panel C are households observed every 10 years after 1740 (1720 and 1730 are excluded because data for 1730 is 
missing). Robust standard errors are clustered by household in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants
samples only samples only samples only samples only samples only samples only
OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A. Land rental (dep. var. = net area of land rented‐in)
Owned‐land (koku ) ‐0.250*** ‐0.620*** ‐0.557*** ‐0.843***
(0.0512) (0.0702) (0.0521) (0.0483)
Land deficit (koku ) 0.304*** 0.641*** 0.531*** 0.803*** 0.239*** 0.608*** 0.537*** 0.837***
(0.0576) (0.0711) (0.0442) (0.0411) (0.0494) (0.0708) (0.0496) (0.0476)
Observations 14472 4161 14472 4161 14472 4161 14472 4161 14472 4161 14472 4161
R‐squared 0.318 0.635 0.408 0.628 0.357 0.659 0.433 0.650 0.312 0.630 0.398 0.623
B. Land transfer (1 year interval) (dep. var. = net area of land acquired)
Owned‐land (koku ) ‐0.0219*** ‐0.453*** ‐0.0621*** ‐0.858***
(0.00421) (0.0752) (0.00647) (0.0816)
Land deficit (koku ) 0.0243*** 0.472*** 0.0524*** 0.816*** 0.0215*** 0.452*** 0.0608*** 0.862***
(0.00425) (0.0716) (0.00501) (0.0776) (0.00410) (0.0760) (0.00616) (0.0828)
Observations 13486 478 13486 478 13486 478 13486 478 13486 478 13486 478
R‐squared 0.033 0.539 0.052 0.684 0.035 0.547 0.049 0.672 0.033 0.539 0.051 0.687
C. Land transfer (10 years interval)  (dep. var. = net area of land acquired)
Owned‐land (koku ) ‐0.207*** ‐0.527*** ‐0.562*** ‐0.987***
(0.0410) (0.0605) (0.0540) (0.0666)
Land deficit (koku ) 0.221*** 0.548*** 0.465*** 0.949*** 0.205*** 0.529*** 0.553*** 0.996***
(0.0425) (0.0623) (0.0470) (0.0781) (0.0398) (0.0605) (0.0505) (0.0637)
Observations 1262 399 1262 399 1262 399 1262 399 1262 399 1262 399
R‐squared 0.202 0.510 0.401 0.644 0.209 0.517 0.364 0.629 0.201 0.513 0.399 0.651
Owned‐land Adjusted land deficit Unadjusted land deficit
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Appendix 
Table A1. Linear projection of area owned or operated  
 
Note: Observations are pooled for all years. Year dummies are included. Robust standard errors are clustered 
by household in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Owned Owned Operated Operated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Head's age ‐0.0381 ‐0.0238 ‐0.0926* ‐0.0756*
(0.0476) (0.0404) (0.0451) (0.0382)
Head's age squared 0.000317 0.000172 0.000636 0.000464
(0.000506) (0.000420) (0.000475) (0.000387)
Female head 0.128 0.0965 ‐0.223 ‐0.262
(0.411) (0.420) (0.417) (0.418)
Status: Mizunomi ‐9.233*** ‐9.309*** ‐3.829*** ‐3.916***
(0.423) (0.396) (0.421) (0.401)
Status: Others ‐3.975** ‐4.200*** ‐2.809* ‐3.080**
(1.323) (1.260) (1.207) (1.154)
Bunke ‐2.585*** ‐2.388*** ‐1.104 ‐0.867
(0.731) (0.625) (0.734) (0.630)
Number of horses 3.989** 2.827*** 4.994*** 3.595***
(1.364) (0.470) (1.317) (0.437)
Number of female members age <10 0.305 0.213 0.496* 0.382
(0.228) (0.246) (0.228) (0.239)
Number of male members age <10 0.532* 0.466 0.924*** 0.843***
(0.247) (0.238) (0.258) (0.243)
Number of female members age 10‐14 0.581* 0.611** 0.707** 0.741***
(0.233) (0.227) (0.227) (0.213)
Number of male members age 10‐14 0.882*** 0.760** 1.208*** 1.058***
(0.249) (0.252) (0.257) (0.272)
Number of female members age 15‐54 0.853*** 0.895*** 1.561*** 1.612***
(0.225) (0.231) (0.230) (0.233)
Number of male members age 15‐54 0.426 0.482* 0.899** 0.967***
(0.286) (0.243) (0.294) (0.254)
Number of female members age >55 0.587* 0.728** 1.200*** 1.371***
(0.288) (0.280) (0.309) (0.307)
Number of male members age >55 ‐0.0948 0.0126 0.457 0.583
(0.477) (0.335) (0.498) (0.349)
Number of non‐kin members 1.423 1.717*
(0.778) (0.748)
Constant 8.317*** 8.342*** 6.006*** 6.043***
(1.320) (1.314) (1.169) (1.143)
Observations 14490 14490 14494 14494
R‐squared 0.510 0.545 0.476 0.528
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Table A2. Estimates on net area of land rented-in  
 
Note: The dependent variable is the net area rented-in (in koku) (negative if rented-out). Year dummies are 
included. Robust standard errors are clustered by household in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants
samples only samples only samples only samples only samples only samples only
OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Owned‐land (koku ) ‐0.250*** ‐0.620*** ‐0.557*** ‐0.843***
(0.0512) (0.0702) (0.0521) (0.0483)
Land deficit (koku ) 0.304*** 0.641*** 0.531*** 0.803*** 0.239*** 0.608*** 0.537*** 0.837***
(0.0576) (0.0711) (0.0442) (0.0411) (0.0494) (0.0708) (0.0496) (0.0476)
Head's age ‐0.0657** ‐0.0665 ‐0.0284 ‐0.0464 ‐0.0420 ‐0.0262 0.00959 ‐0.00533 ‐0.0660** ‐0.0693 ‐0.0326 ‐0.0456
(0.0219) (0.0554) (0.0213) (0.0429) (0.0226) (0.0534) (0.0219) (0.0402) (0.0219) (0.0552) (0.0213) (0.0435)
Head's age squared 0.000421 0.000230 0.0000959 0.000201 0.000257 ‐0.0000268 ‐0.000162 ‐0.0000642 0.000431 0.000265 0.000161 0.000209
(0.000238) (0.000594) (0.000237) (0.000469) (0.000241) (0.000565) (0.000237) (0.000429) (0.000238) (0.000591) (0.000235) (0.000469)
Female head ‐0.312 ‐0.931 ‐0.132 ‐0.119 ‐0.220 ‐0.690 0.0223 0.207 ‐0.282 ‐0.946 ‐0.0846 ‐0.183
(0.282) (0.796) (0.259) (0.623) (0.265) (0.742) (0.238) (0.559) (0.281) (0.798) (0.258) (0.624)
Status: Mizumomi 3.117*** 3.359** 0.994 1.536 3.787*** 5.101*** 3.148*** 4.101*** 3.209*** 3.470** 1.219* 1.551
(0.583) (1.150) (0.591) (0.879) (0.460) (0.976) (0.434) (0.714) (0.567) (1.159) (0.567) (0.879)
Status: Others 0.184 0.338 ‐2.133* 0.902** 0.990 ‐0.236 0.217 0.275 ‐2.046*
(0.459) (1.368) (1.020) (0.347) (1.109) (1.006) (0.461) (1.428) (1.036)
Bunke 0.840** 1.109 0.915*** 1.211 0.873** 1.176
(0.281) (0.836) (0.273) (0.777) (0.282) (0.845)
Number of horses 2.011*** 3.583*** 0.996*** 1.778*** 1.236*** 1.909** ‐0.505* ‐0.232 1.970*** 3.537*** 0.989*** 1.717***
(0.274) (0.631) (0.201) (0.451) (0.359) (0.667) (0.200) (0.403) (0.271) (0.634) (0.206) (0.453)
Number of female members age <10 0.257 1.188*** 0.308* 1.074*** 0.161 0.665* 0.104 0.392 ‐0.345* ‐0.264 ‐1.049*** ‐0.927***
(0.141) (0.335) (0.128) (0.297) (0.127) (0.305) (0.113) (0.269) (0.170) (0.354) (0.148) (0.274)
Number of male members age <10 0.526*** 1.417*** 0.350** 0.793** 0.334* 0.845* ‐0.0221 0.0393 ‐0.0578 ‐0.0222 ‐0.963*** ‐1.201***
(0.137) (0.383) (0.114) (0.244) (0.146) (0.391) (0.117) (0.255) (0.185) (0.457) (0.158) (0.318)
Number of female members age 10‐14 0.261 0.929 0.326 1.154** 0.0827 0.235 ‐0.0397 0.247 ‐0.346 ‐0.530 ‐1.039*** ‐0.823*
(0.173) (0.484) (0.174) (0.372) (0.162) (0.428) (0.166) (0.336) (0.196) (0.450) (0.201) (0.360)
Number of male members age 10‐14 0.549*** 1.842*** 0.442** 1.518*** 0.300* 1.051* ‐0.0582 0.460 ‐0.0442 0.418 ‐0.892*** ‐0.489
(0.148) (0.463) (0.134) (0.350) (0.145) (0.449) (0.130) (0.355) (0.182) (0.482) (0.170) (0.388)
Number of female members age 15‐54 0.928*** 2.222*** 0.673*** 1.488*** 0.479*** 0.992** ‐0.114 ‐0.0878 0.305 0.729* ‐0.719*** ‐0.545
(0.158) (0.396) (0.139) (0.304) (0.134) (0.339) (0.125) (0.284) (0.158) (0.364) (0.167) (0.303)
Number of male members age 15‐54 0.581*** 1.859*** 0.733*** 1.809*** 0.336* 1.096** 0.229 0.826** 0.00386 0.445 ‐0.572** ‐0.175
(0.147) (0.438) (0.116) (0.299) (0.135) (0.419) (0.117) (0.286) (0.166) (0.480) (0.173) (0.340)
Number of female members age >55 0.751*** 2.017*** 0.759*** 1.499*** 0.405* 1.104** 0.153 0.326 0.148 0.562 ‐0.576** ‐0.510
(0.194) (0.470) (0.175) (0.424) (0.177) (0.408) (0.158) (0.355) (0.203) (0.448) (0.192) (0.418)
Number of male members age >55 0.527* 1.448* 0.865*** 1.847*** 0.325 0.963 0.487** 1.212** ‐0.0600 0.0238 ‐0.455* ‐0.112
(0.238) (0.683) (0.173) (0.475) (0.230) (0.652) (0.169) (0.453) (0.244) (0.731) (0.201) (0.507)
Constant ‐0.224 ‐2.679 4.048*** 2.479 ‐1.395 ‐4.951** 0.925 ‐0.595 0.0178 ‐2.112 4.845*** 3.487*
(0.809) (1.828) (0.934) (1.455) (0.712) (1.661) (0.815) (1.308) (0.834) (1.871) (0.956) (1.485)
Observations 14472 4161 14472 4161 14472 4161 14472 4161 14472 4161 14472 4161
R‐squared 0.318 0.635 0.408 0.628 0.357 0.659 0.433 0.650 0.312 0.630 0.398 0.623
Owned‐land Adjusted land deficit Unadjusted land deficit
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Table A3. Estimates on net area of land acquired: 1-year interval 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the net area acquired (in koku) (negative if released) in 1-year intervals. Year 
dummies are included. Robust standard errors are clustered by household in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants
samples only samples only samples only samples only samples only samples only
OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Owned‐land (koku ) ‐0.0219*** ‐0.453*** ‐0.0621*** ‐0.858***
(0.00421) (0.0752) (0.00647) (0.0816)
Land deficit (koku ) 0.0243*** 0.472*** 0.0524*** 0.816*** 0.0215*** 0.452*** 0.0608*** 0.862***
(0.00425) (0.0716) (0.00501) (0.0776) (0.00410) (0.0760) (0.00616) (0.0828)
Head's age 0.00896 0.386*** 0.0131* 0.316* 0.0110* 0.369** 0.0168** 0.298* 0.00892 0.385*** 0.0126* 0.317*
(0.00491) (0.115) (0.00590) (0.133) (0.00501) (0.118) (0.00593) (0.142) (0.00492) (0.115) (0.00590) (0.132)
Head's age squared ‐0.000103* ‐0.00436*** ‐0.000135* ‐0.00318* ‐0.000118* ‐0.00403** ‐0.000160* ‐0.00270 ‐0.000102* ‐0.00436*** ‐0.000128* ‐0.00317*
(0.0000518) (0.00122) (0.0000619) (0.00146) (0.0000526) (0.00124) (0.0000619) (0.00155) (0.0000519) (0.00122) (0.0000617) (0.00145)
Female head ‐0.0167 ‐0.114 ‐0.0134 0.508 ‐0.00923 ‐0.207 ‐0.000332 ‐0.163 ‐0.0137 ‐0.0931 ‐0.00804 0.415
(0.0414) (0.962) (0.0511) (1.201) (0.0410) (0.956) (0.0494) (1.221) (0.0413) (0.958) (0.0509) (1.183)
Status: Mizumomi 0.149** 3.667** 0.0278 ‐1.015 0.220*** 5.058*** 0.312*** 1.793 0.152** 3.677** 0.0433 ‐1.182
(0.0537) (1.194) (0.0929) (1.504) (0.0431) (0.994) (0.0754) (1.360) (0.0530) (1.197) (0.0899) (1.496)
Status: Others ‐0.0739* ‐1.469 ‐0.149 ‐8.630** ‐0.00696 ‐0.125 0.101 ‐6.891* ‐0.0732* ‐1.481 ‐0.148 ‐8.952**
(0.0361) (1.651) (0.0860) (2.897) (0.0248) (1.718) (0.0577) (2.819) (0.0358) (1.656) (0.0851) (2.855)
Bunke 0.0299 0.388 0.0410* 0.321 0.0315 0.439
(0.0200) (0.605) (0.0191) (0.594) (0.0199) (0.606)
Number of horses 0.138*** 1.446* 0.0430 0.480 0.0683* 0.140 ‐0.107** ‐1.534 0.136*** 1.443* 0.0426 0.530
(0.0311) (0.689) (0.0352) (0.886) (0.0333) (0.656) (0.0364) (0.937) (0.0310) (0.685) (0.0354) (0.884)
Number of female members age <10 0.0231 0.859 0.0500 1.062 0.0147 0.482 0.0265 0.299 ‐0.0312 ‐0.201 ‐0.105** ‐0.988
(0.0256) (0.561) (0.0309) (0.714) (0.0251) (0.531) (0.0289) (0.663) (0.0277) (0.565) (0.0320) (0.729)
Number of male members age <10 0.0380 0.677 0.0428 0.690 0.0216 0.299 0.00248 0.101 ‐0.0144 ‐0.390 ‐0.107*** ‐1.426*
(0.0210) (0.460) (0.0218) (0.548) (0.0207) (0.452) (0.0205) (0.579) (0.0222) (0.485) (0.0241) (0.568)
Number of female members age 10‐14 0.0453 1.359 0.0785* 1.422 0.0302 0.823 0.0395 0.439 ‐0.00908 0.261 ‐0.0763* ‐0.680
(0.0297) (0.749) (0.0310) (0.884) (0.0291) (0.748) (0.0300) (0.911) (0.0301) (0.743) (0.0338) (0.945)
Number of male members age 10‐14 0.0344 1.510 0.0520 1.222 0.0132 0.882 ‐0.000843 ‐0.0753 ‐0.0187 0.422 ‐0.0994* ‐0.955
(0.0400) (0.886) (0.0411) (0.844) (0.0393) (0.888) (0.0402) (0.932) (0.0393) (0.844) (0.0399) (0.840)
Number of female members age 15‐54 0.0500* 0.669 0.0507* 0.438 0.0128 ‐0.0642 ‐0.0295 ‐0.930 ‐0.00582 ‐0.390 ‐0.107*** ‐1.553*
(0.0208) (0.472) (0.0255) (0.622) (0.0200) (0.471) (0.0260) (0.663) (0.0212) (0.477) (0.0319) (0.600)
Number of male members age 15‐54 0.0119 0.533 0.0400 1.838** ‐0.00800 ‐0.0168 ‐0.0123 0.520 ‐0.0400 ‐0.493 ‐0.109*** ‐0.207
(0.0208) (0.464) (0.0238) (0.604) (0.0210) (0.474) (0.0233) (0.643) (0.0231) (0.514) (0.0277) (0.677)
Number of female members age >55 0.0428 1.468* 0.0541 1.987** 0.0130 0.844 ‐0.0102 0.728 ‐0.0113 0.410 ‐0.0973** ‐0.130
(0.0267) (0.650) (0.0336) (0.747) (0.0268) (0.657) (0.0330) (0.773) (0.0274) (0.650) (0.0354) (0.742)
Number of male members age >55 ‐0.00590 0.894 0.0294 1.661* ‐0.0216 0.399 ‐0.00963 0.440 ‐0.0588* ‐0.168 ‐0.120*** ‐0.461
(0.0242) (0.616) (0.0247) (0.772) (0.0237) (0.618) (0.0245) (0.813) (0.0236) (0.630) (0.0279) (0.866)
Number of female members born ‐0.0251 ‐0.495 ‐0.0380 0.239 ‐0.0261 ‐0.773 ‐0.0417 ‐0.169 ‐0.0245 ‐0.459 ‐0.0372 0.227
(0.0558) (1.311) (0.0561) (1.439) (0.0558) (1.224) (0.0563) (1.425) (0.0557) (1.311) (0.0558) (1.455)
Number of male members born 0.160** 2.341 0.166** 0.496 0.156** 2.265 0.156** ‐0.192 0.158** 2.333 0.162** 0.421
(0.0578) (1.237) (0.0565) (1.462) (0.0581) (1.314) (0.0570) (1.650) (0.0578) (1.235) (0.0567) (1.423)
Number of female members age <10 died ‐0.0704 ‐4.246 ‐0.0828 ‐3.171 ‐0.0747 ‐4.256 ‐0.0898 ‐2.336 ‐0.0676 ‐4.094 ‐0.0751 ‐2.985
(0.0867) (2.921) (0.0901) (5.508) (0.0870) (3.007) (0.0900) (5.692) (0.0867) (2.880) (0.0898) (5.343)
Number of male members age <10 died ‐0.0829 ‐1.408 ‐0.0970 ‐2.661 ‐0.0816 ‐1.194 ‐0.0930 ‐2.567 ‐0.0808 ‐1.408 ‐0.0923 ‐2.507
(0.0689) (2.289) (0.0724) (2.394) (0.0681) (2.335) (0.0709) (3.097) (0.0692) (2.290) (0.0730) (2.372)
Number of female members age 10‐14 died 0.0228 ‐0.0484 0.0159 ‐0.0440 0.0239 ‐0.0524
(0.103) (0.164) (0.100) (0.140) (0.0998) (0.153)
Number of male members age 10‐14 died 1.465 6.202 1.522 11.17*** 1.443 5.462 1.483 10.91** 1.461 6.199 1.514 11.73***
(0.801) (3.680) (0.806) (2.850) (0.801) (4.224) (0.812) (3.513) (0.801) (3.735) (0.809) (2.810)
Number of female members age 15‐54 died ‐0.184* ‐0.575 ‐0.172* ‐0.248 ‐0.183* ‐0.472 ‐0.171 ‐0.0812 ‐0.183* ‐0.558 ‐0.169 ‐0.241
(0.0921) (3.411) (0.0871) (4.137) (0.0921) (3.352) (0.0869) (3.449) (0.0919) (3.387) (0.0872) (4.030)
Number of male members age 15‐54 died 0.00973 1.557 0.0174 1.373 0.00984 1.056 0.0175 0.605 0.00958 1.534 0.0179 1.472
(0.130) (2.073) (0.125) (2.546) (0.130) (2.121) (0.127) (2.666) (0.130) (2.060) (0.125) (2.468)
Number of female members age >55 died ‐0.0782 ‐2.443 ‐0.0735 ‐5.417 ‐0.0768 ‐1.640 ‐0.0716 ‐2.869 ‐0.0787 ‐2.235 ‐0.0758 ‐4.958
(0.0582) (4.355) (0.0586) (5.362) (0.0581) (4.426) (0.0584) (4.117) (0.0581) (4.380) (0.0586) (5.227)
Number of male members age >55 died 0.00327 1.081 ‐0.00532 1.380 0.00651 1.168 0.00672 1.709 0.00332 1.058 ‐0.00550 1.374
(0.0536) (2.666) (0.0531) (2.932) (0.0534) (2.574) (0.0532) (2.260) (0.0536) (2.590) (0.0531) (2.743)
Constant 0.165 ‐7.259* 0.535 ‐2.805 0.0530 ‐7.865** 0.155 ‐3.872 0.194 ‐6.903* 0.640* ‐1.536
(0.258) (2.842) (0.273) (3.768) (0.257) (2.941) (0.263) (3.931) (0.259) (2.844) (0.274) (3.772)
Observations 13486 478 13486 478 13486 478 13486 478 13486 478 13486 478
R‐squared 0.033 0.539 0.052 0.684 0.035 0.547 0.049 0.672 0.033 0.539 0.051 0.687
Unadjusted land deficitOwned‐land Adjusted land deficit
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Table A4. Estimates on net area of land acquired: 10-year intervals 
 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the net area acquired (in koku) (negative if released) in 10-year intervals. Year 
dummies are included. Robust standard errors are clustered by household in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants All Participants
samples only samples only samples only samples only samples only samples only
OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Owned‐land (koku ) ‐0.207*** ‐0.527*** ‐0.562*** ‐0.987***
(0.0410) (0.0605) (0.0540) (0.0666)
Land deficit (koku ) 0.221*** 0.548*** 0.465*** 0.949*** 0.205*** 0.529*** 0.553*** 0.996***
(0.0425) (0.0623) (0.0470) (0.0781) (0.0398) (0.0605) (0.0505) (0.0637)
Head's age 0.0415 0.223* 0.0790* 0.289* 0.0653 0.252* 0.134** 0.367** 0.0403 0.223* 0.0741 0.298*
(0.0374) (0.103) (0.0385) (0.119) (0.0386) (0.105) (0.0420) (0.134) (0.0375) (0.101) (0.0393) (0.119)
Head's age squared ‐0.000624 ‐0.00290* ‐0.000959* ‐0.00299* ‐0.000802 ‐0.00303** ‐0.00141** ‐0.00364* ‐0.000609 ‐0.00289* ‐0.000889* ‐0.00303*
(0.000409) (0.00114) (0.000419) (0.00133) (0.000418) (0.00116) (0.000454) (0.00146) (0.000410) (0.00113) (0.000426) (0.00132)
Female head 0.0258 ‐0.127 0.187 ‐0.361 0.0892 ‐0.220 0.192 ‐0.550 0.0484 ‐0.191 0.217 ‐0.407
(0.387) (1.231) (0.428) (1.423) (0.385) (1.244) (0.434) (1.403) (0.387) (1.231) (0.428) (1.414)
Status: Mizumomi 1.704** 4.342*** 1.285 ‐0.762 2.425*** 6.002*** 4.017*** 2.723 1.698** 4.341*** 1.387 ‐0.853
(0.598) (1.101) (0.938) (1.459) (0.507) (0.987) (0.792) (1.438) (0.595) (1.101) (0.917) (1.438)
Status: Others ‐0.735 ‐0.664 ‐2.092* 0.108 ‐0.000559 0.0937 0.890* 2.521 ‐0.735 ‐0.678 ‐2.102* ‐0.0790
(0.461) (0.651) (1.033) (1.886) (0.325) (0.656) (0.407) (1.934) (0.473) (0.681) (0.849) (1.899)
Bunke ‐0.0424 ‐0.660 0.0587 ‐0.487 ‐0.0273 ‐0.634
(0.215) (0.520) (0.204) (0.508) (0.214) (0.514)
Number of horses 1.648*** 3.241*** 0.705* 1.653* 1.091*** 1.951** ‐0.467 ‐0.698 1.644*** 3.242*** 0.747* 1.740*
(0.295) (0.636) (0.313) (0.763) (0.304) (0.628) (0.308) (0.746) (0.297) (0.641) (0.317) (0.764)
Number of female members age <10 ‐0.0640 ‐0.180 0.265 0.766 ‐0.0928 ‐0.394 0.195 0.548 ‐0.587* ‐1.461** ‐1.171*** ‐1.606*
(0.217) (0.526) (0.207) (0.651) (0.214) (0.504) (0.199) (0.597) (0.246) (0.558) (0.221) (0.629)
Number of male members age <10 ‐0.0390 ‐0.214 0.0984 0.227 ‐0.123 ‐0.441 ‐0.136 ‐0.154 ‐0.542** ‐1.510*** ‐1.282*** ‐2.219***
(0.193) (0.464) (0.176) (0.514) (0.190) (0.462) (0.169) (0.533) (0.201) (0.443) (0.167) (0.520)
Number of female members age 10‐14 0.0286 0.395 0.136 0.303 ‐0.117 ‐0.368 ‐0.186 ‐1.162 ‐0.494 ‐0.920 ‐1.308*** ‐2.223**
(0.244) (0.660) (0.221) (0.709) (0.242) (0.649) (0.237) (0.780) (0.253) (0.632) (0.270) (0.681)
Number of male members age 10‐14 0.336 1.621* 0.426 1.686* 0.157 0.954 ‐0.00162 0.680 ‐0.184 0.293 ‐0.991*** ‐0.841
(0.245) (0.705) (0.240) (0.731) (0.236) (0.699) (0.236) (0.716) (0.244) (0.704) (0.257) (0.756)
Number of female members age 15‐54 0.261 0.206 0.136 0.143 ‐0.0858 ‐0.622 ‐0.571** ‐1.277* ‐0.274 ‐1.116** ‐1.310*** ‐2.330***
(0.149) (0.379) (0.161) (0.533) (0.154) (0.375) (0.190) (0.615) (0.170) (0.377) (0.239) (0.553)
Number of male members age 15‐54 0.0607 0.657 0.144 0.985* ‐0.221 ‐0.271 ‐0.495** ‐0.544 ‐0.448* ‐0.620 ‐1.245*** ‐1.459**
(0.167) (0.429) (0.151) (0.497) (0.169) (0.444) (0.183) (0.589) (0.180) (0.425) (0.202) (0.510)
Number of female members age >55 0.576* 1.474 0.771* 1.531 0.267 0.596 0.136 0.188 0.0644 0.185 ‐0.623 ‐0.991
(0.280) (0.795) (0.311) (0.859) (0.277) (0.795) (0.319) (0.924) (0.282) (0.797) (0.347) (0.892)
Number of male members age >55 ‐0.173 ‐0.724 0.00252 ‐0.878 ‐0.356 ‐1.039 ‐0.450 ‐1.324 ‐0.671* ‐2.029** ‐1.356*** ‐3.299***
(0.258) (0.709) (0.224) (0.736) (0.257) (0.697) (0.242) (0.749) (0.259) (0.711) (0.249) (0.744)
Number of female members born during inverval 0.299 0.682 0.147 0.647 0.343 0.595 0.217 0.442 0.298 0.686 0.142 0.718
(0.175) (0.411) (0.144) (0.457) (0.177) (0.402) (0.155) (0.459) (0.176) (0.412) (0.147) (0.461)
Number of male members born during inverval 0.346* 1.577** 0.323 1.650** 0.337* 1.408** 0.312 1.371* 0.336* 1.564** 0.291 1.701**
(0.170) (0.474) (0.175) (0.517) (0.167) (0.481) (0.174) (0.549) (0.170) (0.473) (0.176) (0.520)
Number of female members age <10 died during inverval ‐0.0677 ‐0.879 ‐0.0614 ‐1.431* ‐0.0901 ‐0.722 ‐0.0742 ‐1.177 ‐0.0452 ‐0.859 ‐0.00543 ‐1.461*
(0.298) (0.604) (0.255) (0.709) (0.308) (0.627) (0.275) (0.720) (0.299) (0.602) (0.250) (0.687)
Number of male members age <10 died during inverval ‐0.0726 ‐0.111 ‐0.170 ‐1.497 ‐0.0956 ‐0.00965 ‐0.215 ‐1.110 ‐0.0574 ‐0.0976 ‐0.140 ‐1.475
(0.273) (0.674) (0.270) (0.907) (0.267) (0.675) (0.266) (0.936) (0.274) (0.681) (0.275) (0.927)
Number of female members age 10‐14 died during inverval 1.513* 3.332 0.883** 3.546 1.512* 3.992* 1.084 5.525*** 1.563* 3.707 0.936** 4.287
(0.628) (2.494) (0.327) (2.266) (0.762) (1.589) (0.737) (1.332) (0.633) (2.701) (0.341) (2.609)
Number of male members age 10‐14 died during inverval 1.806* 4.277 2.189* 6.563* 1.852* 4.629 2.504* 7.302* 1.773* 4.263 2.072* 6.368*
(0.806) (2.734) (0.916) (2.662) (0.826) (2.798) (0.969) (2.821) (0.805) (2.700) (0.912) (2.591)
Number of female members age 15‐54 died during inverval ‐0.107 ‐1.059 ‐0.0219 ‐0.424 ‐0.0995 ‐0.920 0.0239 0.0709 ‐0.117 ‐1.141 ‐0.0417 ‐0.473
(0.272) (0.874) (0.235) (0.935) (0.274) (0.917) (0.248) (0.924) (0.270) (0.866) (0.232) (0.930)
Number of male members age 15‐54 died during inverval ‐0.223 ‐2.222* ‐0.249 ‐1.068 ‐0.263 ‐2.472* ‐0.387 ‐1.399 ‐0.231 ‐2.281* ‐0.275 ‐1.031
(0.302) (0.913) (0.294) (1.025) (0.303) (0.965) (0.303) (1.042) (0.300) (0.893) (0.290) (1.031)
Number of female members age >55 died during inverval ‐0.119 0.578 ‐0.0566 0.620 ‐0.130 0.526 ‐0.0706 0.857 ‐0.144 0.513 ‐0.123 0.505
(0.281) (0.749) (0.251) (0.823) (0.280) (0.730) (0.255) (0.821) (0.280) (0.746) (0.249) (0.815)
Number of male members age >55 died during inverval 0.289 1.058 0.374 0.417 0.255 0.786 0.373 ‐0.116 0.278 0.998 0.340 0.292
(0.263) (0.673) (0.241) (0.858) (0.266) (0.674) (0.254) (0.893) (0.263) (0.672) (0.242) (0.851)
Constant ‐0.154 ‐2.345 3.866*** 2.022 ‐1.490 ‐4.561 ‐0.330 ‐3.252 0.146 ‐1.645 4.803*** 3.167
(0.921) (2.455) (1.044) (2.539) (0.918) (2.461) (0.940) (2.943) (0.927) (2.403) (1.056) (2.557)
Observations 1262 399 1262 399 1262 399 1262 399 1262 399 1262 399
R‐squared 0.202 0.510 0.401 0.644 0.209 0.517 0.364 0.629 0.201 0.513 0.399 0.651
Owned‐land Adjusted land deficit Unadjusted land deficit
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Figure A1. Average predicted probabilities of adopting factor-ratio stabilization strategies  
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